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Abstract
For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude
that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same
criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison
to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent
premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets.
This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion
does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive
logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical
to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive
equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.
1 Formats for Logics for Plausible Reasoning
This paper has a specific and a more general aim. The specific aim is related
to determining whether two premise sets are equivalent with respect to logics
that explicate defeasible reasoning forms—henceforth DRF. We shall show that
adaptive logics are superior to other formats in this respect. The more general
aim is to highlight the advantages of the adaptive logic program with respect
to other approaches to DRF.
Let us compare the situation with Tarski logics, logics the consequence rela-
tion of which is Reflexive, Transitive and Monotonic. A variety of formulations
∗Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from
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has been developed: axiomatic, Fitch-style, Gentzen-style, etc. Each of these
have their stronger points. The variety, however, is only apparent. First, there
are relatively standard procedures that, for most logics, enable one to turn one
formulation into another. Next, the different formulations are at best different
ways to characterize the same basic entity, viz. the consequence relation, which
assigns to every premise set a consequence set. There are some differences in
semantic styles as well. Again, these may be reduced to each other, except that
some logics require a more complex semantics than others.
The situation is drastically different for logics that explicate DRF. Here a
variety of syntactic formulations have been tried out, each of them often for
some specific cases only. Many of these explications have no semantics, others
require unusual techniques.1 All this raises two central questions.
A first question is whether DRF require a variety of formulations. It is
indeed possible that the domain comprises reasoning forms that are so different
from each other, that it is uninteresting or even impossible to forge them into
the same format. Suppose, however, that it is possible to characterize all DRF
by the same type of logic or logical approach. Then, presumably, there will be
several such approaches. If this is so, a second question should be raised: Which
are the advantages and weaknesses of the different approaches?
It is the aim of the adaptive logic program to characterize all DRF in terms
of an adaptive logic in standard format (see Section 3). This was realized for
a variety of DRF, mostly by tackling such reasoning forms from scratch. Many
DRF have been decently described independently of the adaptive logic pro-
gram. Quite a few of these were characterized by an adaptive logic in standard
format—[5, 7, 12, 54] for handling inconsistent knowledge bases as in [46, 13, 14];
[10] for the signed consequence relations from [15]; [18, 3] for default reasoning
and circumscription,2 documented in [2, 16, 29]; [49] for rational closure from
[26]; [51] for abstract argumentation from [19]; [43] for the belief merging proto-
cols from [24]. Similarly for consequence relations not described as such in the
literature—[33, 32] for question evocation from [55]; [39, 37, 36] for abduction as
described in [1]; [44, 11] for diagnosis from [45]; [35] for the notion of empirical
progress from [25]. For several Tarski logics, an adaptive logic was developed to
circumvent adding new premises (by tinkering)—[34] for the pragmatic struc-
tures from [40, 17]; [52] and [27] on causality as in [42]; [50, 38] for the deontic
logics from [20, 21], and [53] for fuzzy logics. Those characterizations and exten-
sions often require a translation to a different language. Where L is the original
‘logic’ and AL is an adaptive logic, the characterization may have the form:
Γ `L A iff f(Γ) `AL f(A) where f is a function mapping formulas from the
native language (for example the standard predicative language) to a different
language (for example a modal language).
The successes on the adaptive side do not entail that the first question should
be answered in the negative. All that follows is that adaptive logicians were
successful where one attempted to find such a characterization. The attempts
were not exhaustive with respect to the present literature and new forms of
defeasible logics may be discovered in the future. So the situation seems to
1With respect to the semantics, useful unifying work was done by Shoham and associates,
for example [48, 23, 28]. This work is fully in line with the adaptive logic programme: there
is an algorithm for turning any semantic characterization in Shoham’s style into an adaptive
logic.
2These are older results, not in standard format, that soon will be improved upon.
2
justify that adaptive logicians continue their efforts, but it is possible that they
will only be able to unify part of all DRF.
Let us now turn to the second question. One of the arguments adduced
in favour of characterizations in terms of adaptive logics was precisely that this
enterprise has a strong unifying effect, especially as the standard format provides
adaptive logics with a proof theory, a semantics, and all the interesting parts
of the metatheory. But obviously, unification is not the only consideration that
should be taken into account.
In the present paper we shall consider a type of argument that is related
to transparency. To be more precise, the argument concerns criteria for the
equivalence of premise sets. This requires some explanation.
Theories may have different formulations: the same theory may be presented
in different ways. To make the matter more precise, let a theory T be a couple
〈Γ,L〉, in which Γ is a set of statements (the non-logical axioms of T ) and L is
a logic. The claims made by the theory are CnL(Γ) = {A | Γ `L A}. That T =
〈Γ,L〉 and T ′ = 〈Γ′,L〉 are different formulations of the same theory obviously
means that CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′). Similarly, people talking to each other about
some subject may come to the conclusion that they fully agree on the topic. If
they are serious about the matter, they mean to say that all one person believes
on the subject is derivable from the statements made (or agreed to) by the other.
We may safely take it that the agreeing parties share the underlying logic L, at
least in the context of their present communication. So their agreement may be
formally expressed by a statement of the form CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′). Where this
statement holds true, we shall say that Γ and Γ′ are L-equivalent premise sets.
Sameness of theories and mutual agreement are important matters. If two
theories are the same, everything proved from one of them may be carried over
immediately to the other. If two people actually agree about some subject, they
are able to predict everything the other believes about the subject and they may
rely on this, for example in arguments about other topics. Yet, it is obvious
that offering a direct proof of CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′) is out of the question. Put
in a more precise way, it is impossible for humans to enumerate all members
of CnL(Γ) and to demonstrate for each of them that it is also a member of
CnL(Γ′).3 Humans rely on shortcuts in order to establish CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′).
In Section 2, we shall consider three common criteria for deciding that
CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′). These criteria will be shown to be correct for Tarski logics.
We shall show, however, that these criteria cannot be applied to certain popu-
lar formulations of DRF and that no alternatives for the criteria seem available.
This will lead to the question whether there are corresponding criteria for adap-
tive logics. The answer is rather astonishing: the very same criteria may be
applied in the case of adaptive logics. This seems a strong argument in favour
of the adaptive program.
In Section 6, we shall also consider a related question. Suppose that Γ and Γ′
are L-equivalent. Does it follow that Γ∪∆ and Γ′∪∆ are L-equivalent premise
sets? If two people study the same theory, but possibly a different formulation of
it, and both extend their formulation with the same set of statements, we might
expect that the extensions are also L-equivalent. The answer to the question will
be shown to be positive for Tarski logics, but negative for most defeasible logics
3In the text, we neglect some border cases, which are irrelevant to the present discussion,
for example the case in which CnL(Γ) is either empty or trivial.
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presented in the literature. It will turn out that the answer is also negative for
adaptive logics. However, in the case of adaptive logics, the answer is positive
for a criterion that is extremely close to the considered one. Let L′ be weaker
than L iff CnL′(Γ) ⊂ CnL(Γ) for some Γ and CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ) for all Γ and
let L′ be stronger than L iff L is weaker than L′. The L-equivalence of the
extensions is warranted if the two premise sets are L′-equivalent, where L′ is
any Tarski logic weaker than L. We shall also present a criterion that is specific
for adaptive logics and comes very handy for many premise sets.
The lower limit logic of adaptive logics is always a Tarski logic. As it is a
constitutive element of the adaptive logic, it is natural to inquire whether it
plays a specific role with respect to the criteria for equivalence of premise sets
and for the equivalence of their extension. In Section 7, we shall show that the
lower limit logic plays indeed a privileged role: if L is a monotonic logic and L is
weaker than the adaptive logic or the adaptive consequence set is closed under
L, then L is weaker than the adaptive logic’s lower limit logic or identical to it.
The conclusion will be that adaptive logics are not only attractive because
of their unifying power, but also because they have certain properties which
warrant a transparent handling of premise sets.
This paper does not and cannot aim at establishing a final conclusion. As
we said before, new DRF may be discovered in the future. Still, the paper offers
a strong argument for adaptive logics (and against some other approaches to
DRF) and the argument relies on the best present insights.
2 Equivalent Premise Sets
Let us start with some conventions. The set of closed formulas of the considered
language will be called W. A logic L is a function L:℘(W) → ℘(W), in other
words a logic L assigns to every premise set Γ a consequence set, which is
denoted by CnL(Γ). A logic is a Tarski logic iff it fulfils the following three
properties:
Reflexivity: Γ ⊆ CnL(Γ).
Transitivity: If Γ′ ⊆ CnL(Γ) then CnL(Γ′) ⊆ CnL(Γ).
Monotonicity: CnL(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ ∪ Γ′).
Definition 1 Γ and Γ′ are L-equivalent premise sets iff CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′).
If L is a Tarski logic, three simple criteria for the L-equivalence of premise
sets are available:
C1 If Γ′ ⊆ CnL(Γ) and Γ ⊆ CnL(Γ′), then Γ and Γ′ are L-equivalent.
C2 If L′ is a Tarski logic weaker than L, and Γ and Γ′ are L′-equivalent, then
Γ and Γ′ are L-equivalent.
C3 If every CnL(∆) is closed under a Tarski logic L′ (viz. CnL′(CnL(∆)) =
CnL(∆) for all ∆), and Γ and Γ′ are L′-equivalent, then Γ and Γ′ are
L-equivalent.
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Criterion C1 states that, in order for Γ and Γ′ to be L-equivalent, it is
sufficient that all members of Γ are L-derivable from Γ′ and vice versa. In
terms of theories: if T and T ′ have the same underlying logic L and all axioms
of T are L-derivable from T ′ and vice versa, then the two axiom sets are L-
equivalent—T and T ′, if different, are different formulations of the same theory.
A still different rendering proceeds in terms of mutual agreement. Suppose that
two persons state their views about some subject in an exhaustive way—all one
of them holds true about that subject is derivable from the statements made
by this party. If each party then agrees with everything the other said on the
subject, one may conclude that they have the same view on the subject. C1 is
an immediate consequence of the Transitivity of L.
Criterion C2 states that if two premise sets are equivalent with respect to
a Tarski logic weaker than L, then they are equivalent with respect to L. It
is easily seen that C2 holds for all Tarski logics L. Suppose indeed that the
antecedent of C2 is true. As CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ), CnL′(Γ) ∪ Γ ⊆ CnL(Γ) by
the reflexivity of L and hence CnL(CnL′(Γ) ∪ Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ) by the transitivity
of L. So, by the monotonicity of L, CnL(CnL′(Γ) ∪ Γ) = CnL(Γ). Finally,
as CnL′(Γ) ∪ Γ = CnL′(Γ) by the reflexivity of L′, CnL(CnL′(Γ)) = CnL(Γ).
By the same reasoning CnL(CnL′(Γ′)) = CnL(Γ′). As CnL′(Γ) = CnL′(Γ′),
CnL(Γ) = CnL(Γ′).
Criterion C3 is related to the fact that we expect operations under which
L-consequence sets are closed to define a logic that is weaker than L or identical
to it, which triggers C2. If, for all ∆, A∧B ∈ CnL(∆) just in case A ∈ CnL(∆)
and B ∈ CnL(∆), then we expect Γ ∪ {p ∧ q} and Γ ∪ {p, q} to be L-equivalent
premise sets.
Incidently, that L′ is a Tarski logic is essential for both C2 and C3. If L′
were an arbitrary logic, these criteria would not hold. To see this, let W be
the set of closed formulas of the standard language, let CL be classical logic
and let L′ be defined by CnL′(Γ) = {A ∈ Γ | for all B ∈ W, B /∈ CnCL({A})
or B ∈ Γ}. In words, the L′-consequence set of Γ are those members of Γ of
which all CL-consequences are members of Γ. Obviously, it holds for all ∆ that
CnL′(∆) ⊆ CnCL(∆) and also that CnL′(CnCL(∆)) = CnCL(∆). However,
there are infinitely many Γ for which no A ∈ Γ is such that CnCL(A) ⊆ Γ. For
all of them CnL′(Γ) = CnL′(∅) but CnCL(Γ) 6= CnCL(∅).
Obviously, C1 may be combined with C2 or C3. Thus if L′ is a Tarski logic
weaker than L, Γ′ ⊆ CnL′(Γ) and Γ ⊆ CnL′(Γ′), then Γ and Γ′ are L-equivalent.
Let us now turn to defeasible logics. Consider first the Strong (also called
Inevitable) and Weak consequence relations from [46]—see also [13]. Given a
possibly inconsistent set of premises Γ, ∆ ⊆ Γ is a maximal consistent subset
of Γ iff, for all A ∈ Γ − ∆, ∆ ∪ {A} is inconsistent. Γ `Strong A iff A is a
CL-consequence of every maximal consistent subset of Γ and Γ `Weak A iff A
is a CL-consequence of some maximal consistent subset of Γ.
It is easily seen that C1 does not hold for the Weak consequence rela-
tion. Here is an example: {p, q,¬p} ⊆ CnWeak ({p ∧ q,¬p}) and {p ∧ q,¬p} ⊆
CnWeak ({p, q,¬p}), but ¬p ∧ q ∈ CnWeak ({p, q,¬p}) whereas ¬p ∧ q /∈
CnWeak ({p∧ q,¬p}). It is also easily seen that C3 does not hold for the Strong
consequence relation. Let LC be the Tarski logic that consists, apart from
the Premise rule, of the rules Adjunction and Simplification. All Strong conse-
quence sets are closed under LC, viz. CnStrong(Γ) = CnLC(CnStrong(Γ)) for all
Γ. However, CnLC({p, q,¬p}) = CnLC({p ∧ q,¬p}) but CnStrong({p, q,¬p}) 6=
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CnStrong({p ∧ q,¬p}), for example p, q,¬p `Strong q whereas p ∧ q,¬p 0Strong q.
For an example of a logic for which C2 does not hold, we shall remain close
to the Rescher-Manor consequence relations, adding a (weak) Schotch-Jennings
flavour—see for example [47]. A partition of Γ is a set of sets {Γ1, . . . ,Γn}
(n ≥ 1) such that Γ = Γ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γn and Γi ∩ Γj = ∅ for all different i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n}. A partition {Γ1, . . . ,Γn} of Γ is consistent iff every Γi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is
consistent. Obviously, Γ has a consistent partition iff all A ∈ Γ are consistent.
The regular partitions of Γ are the consistent ones or, if there are no consistent
ones, all partitions of Γ. Define: A ∈ CnR(Γ) iff there is a regular partition
{Γ1, . . . ,Γn} of Γ and an i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that A ∈ CnCL(Γi). Define
CnQ(Γ) = CnP(CnR(Γ)), in which P is full positive CL. If {Γ} is a regular
partition of Γ, CnQ(Γ) = CnCL(Γ); if some A ∈ Γ is inconsistent, CnQ(Γ) is
trivial; if Γ is inconsistent but all A ∈ Γ are consistent, CnQ(Γ) is inconsistent
but non-trivial, border cases aside. Note that P is a Tarski logic and that it is
weaker than Q, viz. CnP(Γ) ⊆ CnQ(Γ) for all Γ.
C2 does not hold for the defeasible logic Q. Indeed, P is a Tarski logic
weaker than Q and CnP({p,¬p}) = CnP({p ∧ ¬p}), but CnQ({p ∧ ¬p}) is
trivial whereas CnQ({p,¬p}) is not.
These examples are rather ‘generous’ because the situation is actually worse
for certain systems describing DRF. For example for the many kinds of default
logics the criteria C1–3 should be reformulated in order to make a chance to
be applicable. The set of defaults has to enter the picture and ‘facts’ and de-
faults are to some extend exchangeable. The situation is similar for many other
logics that characterize DFR, even for the very transparent pivotal-assumption
consequences defined in [31].
3 A Brief Introduction to the Standard Format
Adaptive logics adapt themselves to the premise set they are applied to. The
logic adapts itself: it depends on the premise set whether a specific application
of an inference rule is or is not correct. The present most attractive description
of adaptive logics is called the standard format, appearing from [6] on and most
extensively studied in [8], to which we refer for details and metatheoretic proofs.
Nearly all known adaptive logics have been phrased in standard format.
An adaptive logic AL is defined by a triple:
1. A lower limit logic LLL: a reflexive, transitive, monotonic, and compact
logic that has a characteristic semantics and containsCL (Classical Logic).
2. A set of abnormalities Ω : a set of LLL-contingent formulas, characterized
by a (possibly restricted) logical form F which contains at least one logical
symbol.
3. An adaptive strategy : Reliability or Minimal Abnormality.
The lower limit logic is the stable part of the adaptive logic; anything that
follows from the premises by LLL will never be revoked. The lower limit logic
is an extension of CL because it contains all the classical symbols (noted as
¬ˇ,∨ˇ,∧ˇ, ⊃ˇ, ∃ˇ, ∀ˇ, and =ˇ) next to its standard symbols (noted without check).4 In
4Actually, we only use the checked symbol where the corresponding symbol of the standard
language has a different meaning than the CL-symbol.
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standard applications, the classical symbols do not occur in the premises or in
the conclusion. Their function is technical and metatheoretical. Abnormalities
are supposed to be false, ‘unless and until proven otherwise’. Strategies are
ways to cope with derivable disjunctions of abnormalities: an adaptive strategy
picks one specific way to interpret the premises as normally as possible.5
Two typical examples of adaptive logics are the inconsistency-adaptive logics
CLuNr and CLuNm . They are defined as follows. The lower limit logic is
CLuN (C lassical Logic allowing for gluts with respect to N egation), viz. full
positive CL with (A ⊃ ¬A) ⊃ ¬A added as the only axiom for the standard
negation, and extended with classical negation ¬ˇ.6 While A ∨ ¬A is a CLuN-
theorem, A∧¬A is CLuN-contingent. The set of abnormalities Ω comprises all
formulas of the form ∃(A∧¬A) (the existential closure of A∧¬A). The strategies
are respectively Reliability and Minimal Abnormality—see below. The resulting
adaptive logics will be called CLuNr and CLuNm .
Incidentally, if the lower limit logic is extended with an axiom that de-
clares all abnormalities logically false, one obtains the upper limit logic ULL.
If a premise set Γ does not require that any abnormalities are true, the AL-
consequences of Γ are identical to its ULL-consequences. The upper limit logic
of CLuNr and of CLuNm is CL.
In the expression Dab(∆), ∆ is a finite subset of Ω and Dab(∆) denotes
the classical disjunction of the members of ∆. Dab(∆) is called a Dab-formula.
Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ `LLL Dab(∆) whereas Γ 0LLL
Dab(∆′) for any ∆′ ⊂ ∆. Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal
Dab-consequences of Γ, U(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 ∪ . . . The set U(Γ) comprises the
abnormalities that are unreliable with respect to Γ. Where M is a LLL-model,
Ab(M) is the set of abnormalities verified by M .
Definition 2 A LLL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
Definition 3 Γ ²ALr A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
Definition 4 A LLL-modelM of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no LLL-
model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 5 Γ ²ALm A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models of
Γ.
The two strategies are not as different as the above treatment may suggest.
A choice set of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .} is a set that contains an element out of each
member of Σ. A minimal choice set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper
subset is a choice set of Σ. Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal Dab-
consequences of Γ, Φ(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .}.
It can be shown that a LLL-model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff Ab(M) ∈
Φ(Γ).
Adaptive logics have not only a semantics, but also a dynamic proof theory—
see for example [9] for some theory. An annotatedAL-proof consists of lines that
5Apart from Reliability and Minimal Abnormality, several strategies were developed mainly
in order to characterize consequence relations from the literature in terms of an adaptive logic.
All those strategies can be reduced to Reliability or Minimal Abnormality under a translation.
6Suitable axioms are (A ⊃ ¬ˇA) ⊃ ¬ˇA and A ⊃ (¬ˇA ⊃ B). The other classical symbols are
stipulated to be identical to the corresponding standard symbols.
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have four elements: a line number, a formula, a justification and a condition.
Where
A ∆
abbreviates that A occurs in the proof as the formula of a line that has ∆ as its
condition, the (generic) inference rules are:
PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `LLL B: A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `LLL B∨ˇDab(Θ) A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
We shall need to consider stages of proofs, which are lists of lines obtained
by applications of the three above rules, with the usual understanding that the
justification of a line should only refer to lines preceding it in the list. The
empty list will be considered as stage 0 of every proof. Where s is a stage, s′
is an extension of s iff all lines that occur in s occur in the same order in s′. A
(dynamic) proof is a chain of stages. Here comes a peculiarity required by the
Minimal Abnormality strategy. Normally, the extension of a stage is obtained
by appending lines. This is not required here. The added lines may be inserted,
provided that the justification of every line refers only to preceding lines. A line
inserted between lines 4 and 5 may, for example, be numbered 4.1.7
That A is derivable on the condition ∆ may be interpreted as follows: it
follows from the premise set that A or one of the members of ∆ is true. As the
members of ∆, which are abnormalities, are supposed to be false, A is considered
as derived, unless and until it shows that the supposition cannot be upheld.
The precise meaning of “cannot be upheld” depends on the strategy, which
determines the marking definition (see below) and hence determines which lines
are marked at a stage. If a line is marked at a stage, its formula is considered
as not derived at that stage.
We now set out to present the marking definitions. Dab(∆) is a minimal
Dab-formula at stage s of an AL-proof iff Dab(∆) has been derived at that
stage on the condition ∅ whereas there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ for which Dab(∆′) has
been derived on the condition ∅.
Consider a proof from Γ at stage s and let Dab(∆1), . . . , Dab(∆n) be the
minimal Dab-formulas at that stage. Us(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n and Φs(Γ) is the
set of minimal choice sets of {∆1, . . . ,∆n}.
Definition 6 Marking for Reliability: Line l is marked at stage s iff, where ∆
is its condition, ∆ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
7An alternative, which we shall not consider in this paper, is to renumber all lines after
the insertion and to adjust the old line numbers in the justifications.
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Definition 7 Marking for Minimal Abnormality: Line l is marked at stage s
iff, where A is derived on the condition ∆ on line l, (i) there is no ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ)
such that ϕ∩∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line on which A is
derived on a condition Θ for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
This reads more easily: where A is derived on the condition ∆ on line l, line
l is unmarked at stage s iff (i) there is a ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ) for which ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and
(ii) for every ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is a line at which A is derived on a condition Θ
for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
A formula A is derived at stage s of a proof from Γ iff it is the formula of
a line that is unmarked at that stage. Marks may come and go as the proof
proceeds. So one also wants to define a stable notion of derivability, which is
called final derivability.
Definition 8 A is finally derived from Γ on line l of a stage s iff (i) A is the
second element of line l, (ii) line l is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every
extension of the stage in which line l is marked may be further extended in such
a way that line l is unmarked.
Definition 9 Γ `AL A (A is finally AL-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally
derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
In Definition 8, s may be taken to be a finite stage for both strategies. For
the Reliability strategy, the definition may moreover be taken to refer to finite
extensions only. For Minimal Abnormality the definition should be required to
refer to finite as well as to infinite extensions, as was shown in [4, p. 479].
The intuitive notion behind final derivability is the existence of a proof that
is stable with respect to an unmarked line l: A is derived on line l and line l is
unmarked in the proof and in all its extensions. However, for some AL, Γ, and
A, only an infinite proof from Γ in which A is the formula of a line l is stable
with respect to line l.
Definition 8 has an attractive game-theoretic interpretation—see especially
[9]. The proponent has shown that A is finally derived on line l iff, whenever the
opponent extends the proof in such a way that line l is marked, the proponent
is able to extend the extension further in such a way that line l is unmarked.
Note that the preceding sentence refers to all possible extensions. So it can only
be established by a reasoning in the metalanguage.
Before closing this section, we list, for future reference, some theorems that
are proven in [8]. The original numbers are mentioned in brackets.
Theorem 1 Γ ⊆ CnAL(Γ). (Reflexivity) [Th. 11.2]
Theorem 2 CnAL(CnAL(Γ)) = CnAL(Γ). (Fixed Point) [Th. 11.6–7]
Theorem 3 If Γ′ ⊆ CnAL(Γ) then CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(Γ ∪ Γ′). [Th. 11.10]
Note that the Theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of the following two
• Cautious Monotonicity (if Γ′ ⊆ CnAL(Γ) then CnAL(Γ) ⊆ CnAL(Γ∪Γ′))
[Th. 11.12]
• Cumulative Transitivity (if Γ′ ⊆ CnAL(Γ) then CnAL(Γ∪Γ′) ⊆ CnAL(Γ))
[Th. 11.11].
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Theorem 4 Γ `ALm A iff, for every ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ), there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that
∆ ∩ ϕ = ∅ and Γ `LLL A∨ˇDab(∆). [Th. 8]
Theorem 5 CnLLL(Γ) ⊆ CnALr (Γ) ⊆ CnALm (Γ) ⊆ CnULL(Γ). [Th. 11.1]
From here on, “adaptive logic” will always refer to an adaptive logic in
standard format.
4 Equivalent Premise Sets and Adaptive Logics
It was proved that all adaptive logics have the properties Reflexivity, Cumulative
Transitivity, Cautious Monotonicity, and Fixed Point. From this it is easily
provable that C1–C3 hold for all of them. Note that each of the three criteria
greatly simplifies the identification of equivalent premise sets (or theories).
Theorem 6 C1 holds for all adaptive logics.
Proof. Suppose that Γ′ ⊆ CnAL(Γ) and Γ ⊆ CnAL(Γ′). By Theorem 3,
CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(Γ ∪ Γ′) and CnAL(Γ′) = CnAL(Γ ∪ Γ′). So CnAL(Γ) =
CnAL(Γ′).
The following lemma establishes that C2 and C3 are coextensive whenever
L is reflexive and CnL(Γ) is a fixed point.
Lemma 1 If L is reflexive, CnL(Γ) is a fixed point (CnL(Γ) = CnL(CnL(Γ))
for all Γ), and L′ is reflexive and monotonic, then CnL′(CnL(Γ)) = CnL(Γ) for
all Γ iff CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ) for all Γ. (Closure Lemma)
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. So, for all Γ, Γ ⊆ CnL(Γ) by
the reflexivity of L and hence, for all Γ, CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL′(CnL(Γ)) by the
monotonicity of L′. We have to prove an equivalence.
⇒ Suppose that, for all Γ, CnL′(CnL(Γ)) = CnL(Γ). Γ ⊆ CnL(Γ) by the
reflexivity of L. So CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL′(CnL(Γ)) by the monotonicity of L′. From
this and the supposition follows that, for all Γ, CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ).
⇐ Suppose that, for all Γ, CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnL(Γ) and hence CnL′(CnL(Γ)) ⊆
CnL(CnL(Γ)). As CnL(Γ) is a fixed point, it follows that CnL′(CnL(Γ)) ⊆
CnL(Γ) for all Γ. So, by the reflexivity of L′, CnL′(CnL(Γ)) = CnL(Γ) for all
Γ.
Theorem 7 C2 and C3 hold for all adaptive logics.
Proof. C2 and C3 are coextensive for all adaptive logics because of Lemma
1 together with Theorems 1 and 2. It suffices to prove that C2 holds for all
adaptive logics. Suppose that the antecedent of C2, CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnAL(Γ), holds
true for all Γ. As AL is reflexive (Theorem 1), it follows that
Γ ∪ CnL′(Γ) ⊆ CnAL(Γ) .
From this, by Theorem 3,
CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(Γ ∪ CnL′(Γ)) ,
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whence, as L′ is reflexive,
CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(CnL′(Γ)) .
By the same reasoning
CnAL(Γ′) = CnAL(CnL′(Γ′)) .
So, as CnL′(Γ) = CnL′(Γ′) by the supposition,
CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(Γ′) .
Note that, for every adaptive logic AL, LLL is a Tarski logic weaker than
AL. So if two premise sets are LLL-equivalent, they are also AL-equivalent
in view of C2. For some premise sets, however, one needs to rely directly on
C1. An example is that CnCLuNm ({p}) = CnCLuNm ({p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q)}). While
CnCLuN({p}) 6= CnCLuN({p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q)}), it is easy enough to show that
{p} `CLuNm p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q) and that {p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q)} `CLuNm p.
5 Characterizations Under a Translation
Some readers may be puzzled by our claim that criteria C1–3 hold for the
characterization of a DRF in terms of an adaptive logic while they do not
hold for other characterizations—see Section 1. The reason is that the former
characterizations are realized under a translation. In order to make this paper
more self-contained, we present two examples. Consider first the logic Q from
Section 2, restricting the discussion to the propositional level.
Let B abbreviate ¤♦. Where T is the well-known modal logic of Feys—see,
for example, [22]8—let the modal logic Tm be defined by (i) the lower limit
T, (ii) the set of abnormalities Ω = {(BA ∧ BB) ∧ ¬B(A ∧ B) | A,B ∈ W},
and (iii) Minimal Abnormality. It is provable that, where B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn is the
conjunctive normal form of A and ΓB = {BC | C ∈ Γ}, Γ `Q A iff ΓB `Tm
BB1 ∧ . . . ∧BBn.
Note that every minimal Dab-formula that is T-derivable from ΓB com-
prises only one disjunct.9 This means that, for statements of the form ΓB `Tm
BB1∧ . . .∧BBn, Minimal Abnormality and Reliability boil down to the Simple
strategy. Thus the marking definition may be simplified to: a line is marked iff
some member of its condition has been derived on the empty condition. Simi-
larly, a T-model M of ΓB is a Tm -model of ΓB iff Ab(M) =
⋂{Ab(M ′) |M ′ is
a T-model of ΓB} = {A ∈ Ω | ΓB `T A}.
Let us now turn to the fact that C2 does not hold for Q—for example
P-equivalence does not warrant Q-equivalence—whereas C2 holds for Tm in
view of Theorem 7. This opposition obviously derives from the fact that Tm
distinguishes between B(p∧¬p), which has no T-models, and Bp∧B¬p, which
8Except that, in order to define Γ ²T A, a T-model is defined as M = 〈W,w0, R, v〉 with
w0 ∈W and M is said to verify A iff vM (A,w0) = 1.
9The property does not hold for all premise sets but is typical for premise sets ΓB with Γ
a set of modal-free formulas.
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does, whereas Q blurs this distinction. For example {p,¬p} is P-equivalent to
{p ∧ ¬p}, whereas {Bp,B¬p} is not T-equivalent to {B(p ∧ ¬p)}.
The situation is similar for the Strong and Weak consequence relations,
which were employed to illustrate the non-applicability of C1 and C3. Here we
only consider the Strong consequence relation. Let the premises be formulated
with classical negation, ¬ˇ. Let Γ¬¬ˇ = {¬¬ˇA | A ∈ Γ} and let W 6¬ be the set
of closed formulas that do not contain ¬ (but may contain ¬ˇ). It was proved
in [5]10 that CnStrong(Γ) = CnCLuNm (Γ¬¬ˇ) ∩ W 6¬. Note that Theorems 1–3
hold for CnCLuNm (Γ), but that they do not hold for the consequence relation
that maps Γ to CnCLuNm (Γ¬¬ˇ) ∩ W 6¬. Thus if p ∧ q, ¬ˇp ∈ Γ, neither of them
will be in CnStrong(Γ); ¬¬ˇ(p ∧ q) and ¬¬ˇ¬ˇp will be members of both Γ¬¬ˇ and
CnCLuNm (Γ¬¬ˇ) but obviously not of CnCLuNm (Γ¬¬ˇ)∩W 6¬. Note also that the
required translation does not complicate the applicability of C1–C3.
6 Extension of Equivalent Premise Sets
Let us now turn to the announced related problem: the equivalence of extensions
of equivalent premise sets. In this respect adaptive logics do not behave like
Tarski logics. At first sight, they seem to behave just as strangely as other
formal approaches to DRF.
Fact 1 If L is a Tarski logic, then CnL(Γ1) = CnL(Γ2) warrants that CnL(Γ1∪
∆) = CnL(Γ2 ∪∆).
Fact 2 CnAL(Γ1) = CnAL(Γ2) does not warrant that CnAL(Γ1∪∆) = CnAL(Γ2∪
∆).
That the second fact holds follows immediately from the following example:
CnCLuNm ({p}) = CnCLuNm ({p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q)}) but
CnCLuNm ({p, q ∧ ¬q}) 6= CnCLuNm ({p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q), q ∧ ¬q}).
Note that the example may be adjusted to any adaptive logic in which classical
disjunction is present or definable. The example clearly indicates the most
straightforward reason why the fact holds. The formula q∧¬q is an abnormality
and hence is supposed to be false ‘unless and until proven otherwise’. The
original premise sets are equivalent because p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q) is the only premise of
the second premise set and its minimal abnormal interpretation leads to p. If,
however, q ∧ ¬q is added to the premise sets,{p, q ∧ ¬q} still gives us p because
CLuNm is reflexive, but p is not derivable from {p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q), q ∧ ¬q} because
this extended premise set requires q∧¬q to be true and has the same CLuNm -
consequences as {q ∧ ¬q}. To the negative fact corresponds a positive result
which is very similar to it.
Theorem 8 If L is a Tarski logic weaker than AL and CnL(Γ1) = CnL(Γ2),
then CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) = CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆) for all ∆.
10The paraconsistent negation is there written as ∼ (here as ¬) and the classical negation
as ¬ (here as ¬ˇ).
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Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. In view of the reflexivity of L,
(i) ∆ ⊆ CnL(Γ1∪∆) and (ii) CnL(Γ1) = CnL(Γ2) warrants that Γ2 ⊆ CnL(Γ1).
As L is monotonic, it follows that Γ2 ∪ ∆ ⊆ CnL(Γ1 ∪ ∆). So Γ2 ∪ ∆ ⊆
CnAL(Γ1∪∆) in view of CnL(Γ1∪∆) ⊆ CnAL(Γ1∪∆). By the same reasoning
Γ1 ∪ ∆ ⊆ CnAL(Γ2 ∪ ∆). But then, in view of Theorem 6, CnAL(Γ1 ∪ ∆) =
CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆).
For adaptive logics there is a weaker alternative for Fact 1. For this, we need
another definition.
Definition 10 A set of formulas Θ is an AL-monotonic extension of a set of
formulas Γ iff Γ ⊂ Θ and CnAL(Γ) ⊆ CnAL(Θ).
Theorem 9 If Γ1 ∪ ∆ is an AL-monotonic extension of Γ1 and Γ2 ∪ ∆ is
an AL-monotonic extension of Γ2, then CnAL(Γ1) = CnAL(Γ2) warrants that
CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) = CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆)
Proof. Suppose CnAL(Γ1) = CnAL(Γ2), Γ1 ∪∆ is an AL-monotonic extension
of Γ1 and Γ2 ∪ ∆ is an AL-monotonic extension of Γ2. By definition 10, the
second supposition implies that
CnAL(Γ1) ⊆ CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) .
In view of the reflexivity of adaptive logics
∆ ⊆ CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) .
From the two previous results, one obtains immediately that
CnAL(Γ1) ∪∆ ⊆ CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) ,
and with Theorem 3
CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) = CnAL(CnAL(Γ1) ∪∆ ∪ Γ1) .
In view of the reflexivity of AL, Γ1 ⊆ CnAL(Γ1), whence:
CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) = CnAL(CnAL(Γ1) ∪∆) .
With the same reasoning, the following is provable
CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆) = CnAL(CnAL(Γ2) ∪∆) .
The supposition implies that CnAL(CnAL(Γ1) ∪∆) = CnAL(CnAL(Γ2) ∪∆),
whence
CnAL(Γ1 ∪∆) = CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆) .
There are criteria for deciding whether an extension is AL-monotonic. The
criteria depend on the strategy, which is the third element of the adaptive logic
AL. The criteria we introduce below may be not the sharpest possible ones,
but it is obvious that they are correct. Let Γ be the original premise set and Γ′
the extended premise set.
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For the Reliability strategy, the criterium reads: If Γ ⊆ Γ′ and U(Γ′) ⊆ U(Γ)
then Γ′ is an AL-monotonic extension of Γ. In words: if every abnormality that
is unreliable with respect to Γ′ is also unreliable with respect to Γ, then Γ′ is
an AL-monotonic extension of Γ. In terms of the proof theory, this means that
every unmarked line in a proof from Γ remains unmarked if the premise set is
extended to Γ′. This warrants that the final consequences of Γ are also final
consequences of Γ′. Obviously, some lines that are marked in a proof from Γ
may be unmarked in a proof from Γ′. The effect of this is that the latter premise
set has more, but not less, consequences than the former.
For the Minimal Abnormality strategy, the criterium reads: If Γ ⊆ Γ′ and
for every ∆′ ∈ Φ(Γ′), there is a ∆ ⊇ ∆′ such that ∆ ∈ Φ(Γ), then Γ′ is an
AL-monotonic extension of Γ. This criterium is most easily understood from a
semantic point of view. The antecedent warrants that every AL-model of Γ′ is
an AL-model of Γ and hence verifies every formula verified by all AL-models
of Γ.
It is instructive to illustrate the difference between the two criteria in terms
of CLuNr and CLuNm . Let Γ = {(p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (q ∧ ¬q), (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (r ∧ ¬r),
s∨ (p∧¬p), s∨ (q∧¬q)} and let Γ′ = Γ∪{q∧¬q}. As U(Γ) = U(Γ′) = {p∧¬p,
q ∧ ¬q, r ∧ ¬r}, Γ′ is a CLuNr -monotonic extension of Γ. Note, however, that
Φ(Γ) = {{p ∧ ¬p}, {q ∧ ¬q, r ∧ ¬r}} whereas Φ(Γ′) = {{q ∧ ¬q, p ∧ ¬p}, {q ∧
¬q, r ∧ ¬r}}. So Γ′ is not a CLuNm -monotonic extension of Γ and actually
Γ `CLuNm s whereas Γ′ 0CLuNm s.
7 Maximality of the Lower Limit Logic
As LLL is a Tarski logic weaker than AL, Theorem 8 entails the following.
Corollary 1 If CnLLL(Γ1) = CnLLL(Γ2), then CnAL(Γ1∪∆) = CnAL(Γ2∪∆)
for all ∆.
Obviously, the corollary can also be proved directly. As LLL is a Tarski
logic, CnLLL(Γ1) = CnLLL(Γ2) warrants that CnLLL(Γ1∪∆) = CnLLL(Γ2∪∆)
by Fact 1 and CnLLL(Γ1 ∪ ∆) = CnLLL(Γ2 ∪ ∆) warrants CnAL(Γ1 ∪ ∆) =
CnAL(Γ2 ∪∆) by Theorem 7.
We shall now prove that the lower limit logic LLL of an adaptive logic
AL is not only a Tarski logic that is weaker than AL but that actually every
monotonic logic L that is weaker than AL is weaker than LLL or identical to
LLL. In the proof of the following theorem we rely on the compactness of LLL,
but do not require L to be compact.
Theorem 10 For all monotonic logics L weaker than ALm and for all Γ,
CnL(Γ) ⊆ CnLLL(Γ).
Proof. Suppose that L is a monotonic logic weaker than ALm and that there
is a Γ and a B for which the following three hold.
Γ 0LLL B (1)
Γ `L B (2)
Γ `ALm B (3)
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Let Γ′ = {Dab(∆) | Γ `LLL B∨ˇDab(∆)}. In view of the definition of Γ′, (1)
entails (4); (5) follows from (2) by the monotonicity of L, and (6) follows from
(5) by the supposition.
Γ ∪ Γ′ 0LLL B (4)
Γ ∪ Γ′ `L B (5)
Γ ∪ Γ′ `ALm B (6)
In view of Theorem 4, it follows from (6) and (4) that, for every ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ∪ Γ′),
there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that
Γ ∪ Γ′ `LLL B∨ˇDab(∆), ∆ 6= ∅ and ∆ ∩ ϕ = ∅ . (7)
In view of the compactness and monotonicity of LLL there are Dab(∆1), . . . ,
Dab(∆n) ∈ Γ′ such that
Γ ∪ {Dab(∆1), . . . ,Dab(∆n)} `LLL B∨ˇDab(∆) . (8)
As Γ `LLL B∨ˇDab(∆i) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Γ `LLL B∨ˇ
(∧ˇn
i=1
Dab(∆i)
)
. (9)
From (8) follows
Γ ∪
{∧ˇn
i=1
Dab(∆i)
}
`LLL B∨ˇDab(∆), (10)
whence, by the Deduction Theorem,
Γ `LLL
(∧ˇn
i=1
Dab(∆i)
)
⊃ˇ(B∨ˇDab(∆)) . (11)
From (9) and (11) follows
Γ `LLL B∨ˇDab(∆) , (12)
whence Dab(∆) ∈ Γ′. But then every ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ ∪ Γ′) contains at least one
member of ∆, which contradicts (7).
It follows from Theorem 5 that this result also holds when the third element
of AL is Reliability. Hence we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Every monotonic logic L that is weaker than AL is weaker than
LLL or identical to LLL.
Lemma 1 gives us a further corollary.
Corollary 3 If CnAL(Γ) is closed under a monotonic logic L, then L is weaker
than LLL or identical to LLL.
The upshot is that the lower limit logic LLL allows for very sharp appli-
cations of C2 and C3. Moreover, the lower limit logic is the strongest Tarski
logic L weaker than AL for which holds: if two premise sets are L-equivalent
and both are extended with the same set of formulas, then these extensions are
AL-equivalent. All this highlights the pivotal role of the lower limit logic.
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8 In Conclusion
We have proved that criteria C1–C3, which are standard for identifying equiv-
alent premise sets with respect to Tarski logics, also apply to adaptive logics.
This is a major advantage of adaptive logics in comparison to other formal ap-
proaches to defeasible reasoning forms because the criteria are transparent and
easy to check. This is especially so in view of the pivotal role played by the
lower limit logic.
With respect to extensions of equivalent premise sets, adaptive logics do
not behave like Tarski logics, but we have located a criterion that is simple
and close to that for Tarski logics—and moreover a criterion that is specific
for adaptive logics. We have also shown that the strongest Tarski logic weaker
than an adaptive logic in standard format is its lower limit and that the lower
limit logic is the strongest Tarski logic under which the adaptive consequence
set is closed. This means that equivalence with respect to the lower limit logic
does not only provide a criterion for adaptive equivalence, but also provides
a maximally strong criterion for deciding that similar extensions of adaptively
equivalent premise sets are adaptively equivalent.
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